RA.L3-3.11.5e
Security Solution Effectiveness
Requirement
Assessment objectives
An assessor checks each lettered objective separately. The letters in brackets elsewhere on this page, such as [a] or [b,c], refer to these.
Determine if:
- aSecurity solutions are identified;
- bCurrent and accumulated threat intelligence is identified;
- cAnticipated risk to organizational systems and the organization based on current and accumulated threat intelligence is identified; and
- dThe effectiveness of security solutions is assessed at least annually or upon receipt of relevant cyber threat information, or in response to a relevant cyber incident, to address anticipated risk to organizational systems and the organization based on current and accumulated threat intelligence.
From the CMMC Level 3 Assessment Guide v2.13 · publisher approved 2026-11-08.
How to implement
At least annually, and also when relevant threat information arrives or after a relevant incident, test whether your security solutions actually stop or detect the threats you expect, based on current and accumulated threat intelligence. This goes beyond the Level 2 control assessment (is the control in place) to adversary-informed testing (would it work against this actor's techniques). Free adversary emulation tools exist; breach and attack simulation platforms and outside testers are the paid options.
The minimum for a small organization · Expert CMMC's reading, not official text
List your security solutions [a] and the threat intelligence you have gathered [b], and from it the risks you expect [c]. Test whether the solutions hold up against those risks at least once a year, when relevant threat information arrives, and after a relevant incident [d], and feed the gaps into your plan of action.
Required outcome: what the requirement or its objectives call for. Recommended way: one common way to get there. Going further: worth doing, more than this practice asks.
- 1Required outcomeProcessIdentify the security solutions to be assessed, the current and accumulated threat intelligence you hold, and the risk it anticipates to your systems and the organization.[a][b][c]
You can tell it worked when the assessment plan names the solutions, the threat intelligence used and the anticipated risks drawn from it.
- 2Required outcomeProcessAssess the effectiveness of the security solutions at least annually or upon receipt of relevant cyber threat information, or in response to a relevant cyber incident, to address the anticipated risk.[d]
You can tell it worked when an effectiveness assessment dated within the last 12 months, covering the solutions' deployed settings and not only their design, exists, plus a targeted check for each relevant threat report or incident since.
- 3
- 4
- 5Recommended wayTechnicalTest the solutions against those scenarios: adversary emulation or breach and attack simulation on test endpoints, phishing and email security tests, detection checks in the SIEM, configuration benchmark comparisons, and results from penetration testing (CA.L3-3.12.1e).[d]
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Evidence to collect
Artifacts that show the practice is implemented and operating. Tags show which assessment objectives each one supports.
A process you started recently is shown honestly by its dated procedure, the first record it produced and the date it began. No evidence row needs more history than the process has existed, and the review periods shown are suggestions unless a guide page or regulation is named beside them.
Effectiveness assessment policy[d]
Trigger-driven assessment records[d]
Test tool output[d]
Plan of action entries from gaps[c]
The detail for 5 evidence items: how to produce each, how fresh it must be, what it must include and what it does not show.
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How assessors check
What an assessor examines, asks and tests: 3 notes.
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Tools and products
Named options a contractor can adopt, with an honest cost tier. The industry standard is listed even when it is expensive, alongside what is free and acceptable for a very small shop.
Notes on 5 products for this practice: why each matters here, what it assumes and what stays yours.
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Editorial mentions, not endorsements. Pricing and tiers change; confirm with the vendor and check FedRAMP or GCC High availability where CUI is involved.
Common pitfalls
- Re-running the Level 2 control checklist and calling it an effectiveness assessment.
- Tests chosen without reference to threat intelligence.
- No record of trigger-driven assessments after relevant advisories or incidents.
- Running emulation in production without change approval and rollback planning.
Platform notes
- Microsoft 365 (GCC / GCC High)
- Google Workspace
- On-premises or MSP-managed
Notes for 3 platforms.
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Related practices: CA.L2-3.12.1, RA.L3-3.11.1e, RA.L3-3.11.4e, CA.L3-3.12.1e, IR.L3-3.6.2e
Editorial implementation guidance published November 14, 2026. It is not part of the official requirement and does not replace the assessment guide.
Crosswalk
Full crosswalkThe NIST requirements this practice is built on, what NIST made of each in the newer edition, and the SP 800-53 controls behind them, each from an official NIST or DoD table. Open any one to read it and see every CMMC practice it supports.
NIST SP 800-172 (Feb 2021)
3.11.5eSP 800-172 Rev 3
03.11.01E03.11.05E withdrawn; addressed by03.11.03E03.11.05E withdrawn; addressed by800-171 03.11.0103.11.05E withdrawn; addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)800-171 03.11.0403.11.05E withdrawn; addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)800-171 03.12.0103.11.05E withdrawn; addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)800-171 03.12.0303.11.05E withdrawn; addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)—
SP 800-53 Rev 5
CA-2SCA-7SPM-16SRA-3CSRA-3(1)SRA-3(3)CRA-3(4)SRA-7SSR-6SHow these were reachedHide how these were reached
- CA-2 · Control Assessments
- S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL) · via 800-171 Rev 3 03.12.01 → 800-53 Rev 5 CA-2NIST: 03.12.01 also: 3.11.6e, 3.14.3e addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)
- CA-7 · Continuous Monitoring
- S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL) · via 800-171 Rev 3 03.12.03 → 800-53 Rev 5 CA-7NIST: 03.12.03 also: 3.11.6e addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3); SP 800-171 Rev 2 3.4.9 addressed by
- PM-16 · Threat Awareness Program
- S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL) · via 800-172 Rev 3 03.11.01E → 800-53 Rev 5 PM-16
- RA-3 · Risk Assessment
- S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL) · via 800-171 Rev 3 03.11.01 → 800-53 Rev 5 RA-3NIST: 03.11.01 also: 3.11.4e, 3.11.6e addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)
- C SP 800-172 (Feb 2021) Appendix C
- RA-3(1) · Risk Assessment | Supply Chain Risk Assessment
- S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL) · via 800-171 Rev 3 03.11.01 → 800-53 Rev 5 RA-3(1)NIST: 03.11.01 also: 3.11.4e, 3.11.6e addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)
- RA-3(3) · Risk Assessment | Dynamic Threat Awareness
- C SP 800-172 (Feb 2021) Appendix C
- RA-3(4) · Risk Assessment | Predictive Cyber Analytics
- S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL) · via 800-172 Rev 3 03.11.03E → 800-53 Rev 5 RA-3(4)
- RA-7 · Risk Response
- S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL) · via 800-171 Rev 3 03.11.04 → 800-53 Rev 5 RA-7NIST: 03.11.04 also: 3.11.4e, 3.11.6e addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)
- SR-6 · Supplier Assessments and Reviews
- S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL) · via 800-171 Rev 3 03.11.01 → 800-53 Rev 5 SR-6NIST: 03.11.01 also: 3.11.4e, 3.11.6e addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)
Rev 5 paths: D SP 800-171 Rev 2 Appendix D → SP 800-53 Rev 4 control → NIST's Rev 4 → Rev 5 comparison; S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL); C SP 800-172 (Feb 2021) Appendix C. NIST also names this Rev 3 requirement as the successor of other withdrawn requirements: open “How these were reached” under the Rev 5 controls for which, in NIST's words.
Where each link comes from (18 links from 6 official documents)
32 CFR 170.14 Office of the Federal Register / GPO
- RA.L3-3.11.5e → 3.11.5e“Level 3 security requirement”32 CFR 170.14(c)(4), Table 1, item (xvii)
- 03.11.05E → 03.11.01E“Addressed by”p.56
- 03.11.05E → 03.11.03E“Addressed by”p.56
- 03.11.05E → 03.11.01“Addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)”p.56
- 03.11.05E → 03.11.04“Addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)”p.56
- 03.11.05E → 03.12.01“Addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)”p.56
- 03.11.05E → 03.12.03“Addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)”p.56
NIST SP 800-171 Rev 3 (OSCAL) NIST
- 03.12.01 → CA-2“Source control”control 03.12.01 link rel=reference (CA-02)
- 03.12.03 → CA-7“Source control”control 03.12.03 link rel=reference (CA-07)
- 03.11.01 → RA-3“Source control”control 03.11.01 link rel=reference (RA-03)
- 03.11.01 → RA-3(1)“Source control”control 03.11.01 link rel=reference (RA-03(01))
- 03.11.04 → RA-7“Source control”control 03.11.04 link rel=reference (RA-07)
- 03.11.01 → SR-6“Source control”control 03.11.01 link rel=reference (SR-06)
Trace notes
Notes marked NIST state what the owners' own files say. Notes marked Expert CMMC note are our reading of the links, not official guidance. Neither is a crosswalk link.
About SP 800-172 (Feb 2021) 3.11.5e
NIST
NIST's own files disagree on the relationship of SP 800-172 Rev 3's withdrawn requirements to their successors. NIST SP 800-172 Rev 3, p.23 (03.01.03E) and the other withdrawn entries: "Addressed by 03.01.09E, 03.01.10E, and 03.01.03 (SP 800-171)." The PDF names SP 800-171 Rev 3 requirements too. NIST SP 800-172 Rev 3 (OSCAL), control 03.01.03E link rel=incorporated_into: incorporated_into 03.01.09E and 03.01.10E; the SP 800-171 Rev 3 requirement only as a bare external_reference.
Sources: NIST SP 800-172 Rev 3, p.23 (03.01.03E) and the other withdrawn entries; NIST SP 800-172 Rev 3 (OSCAL), control 03.01.03E link rel=incorporated_into
Expert CMMC note
The crosswalk uses the publication's "Addressed by" wording and its full list of successors, including the SP 800-171 Rev 3 requirements; NIST's change analysis uses the same wording. (Precedence: the publication of record over OSCAL over supplemental workbooks.)
Relies on: NIST SP 800-172 Rev 3; NIST SP 800-172 Rev 3 (OSCAL)
Further discussion
Practice guide notes
Implementation guidance
Editorial examples to help you plan. Adapt them to your environment; the official requirement and objectives remain authoritative.
In plain language
Assess how well security solutions work at least yearly and after relevant threat information or incidents, using current threat intelligence.
Implementation example
Example from the source assessment guide (not a mandatory implementation): You are responsible for information security in your organization, which holds and processes CUI. The organization subscribes to multiple threat intelligence sources [b]. In order to assess the effectiveness of current security solutions, the security team analyzes any new incidents reported in the threat feed. They identify weaknesses that were leveraged by malicious actors and subsequently look for similar weaknesses in their own security architecture[a,c]. This analysis is passed to the architecture team for engineering change recommendations, including system patching guidance, new sensors, and associated alerts that should be generated, and to identify ways to mitigate, transfer, or accept the risk necessary to respond to events if they occur within their own organization [d].
Evidence examples
Examples suggested by the source guide (not an exhaustive or mandatory checklist): Risk assessment policy; security planning policy and procedures; security assessment policy and procedures; security assessment plans; security assessment results; procedures addressing organizational assessments of risk; security plan; risk assessment; risk assessment results; risk assessment reviews; risk assessment updates; threat intelligence information; other relevant documents or records
Common mistakes
Assessing controls only for compliance coverage, never for effectiveness against current threats.
Track this in a workspace
The compliance workspace tracks each objective, its evidence and the tasks to close gaps. It is open to invited contractors while in pilot: request access below.
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Source: DoD CIO · https://dodcio.defense.gov/CMMC/