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CMMC · Rev 2.13L3RA · Risk Assessment

RA.L3-3.11.5e

Security Solution Effectiveness

Requirement

Assess the effectiveness of security solutions at least annually or upon receipt of relevant cyber threat information, or in response to a relevant cyber incident, to address anticipated risk to organizational systems and the organization based on current and accumulated threat intelligence.

Assessment objectives

An assessor checks each lettered objective separately. The letters in brackets elsewhere on this page, such as [a] or [b,c], refer to these.

Determine if:

  1. aSecurity solutions are identified;
  2. bCurrent and accumulated threat intelligence is identified;
  3. cAnticipated risk to organizational systems and the organization based on current and accumulated threat intelligence is identified; and
  4. dThe effectiveness of security solutions is assessed at least annually or upon receipt of relevant cyber threat information, or in response to a relevant cyber incident, to address anticipated risk to organizational systems and the organization based on current and accumulated threat intelligence.

From the CMMC Level 3 Assessment Guide v2.13 · publisher approved 2026-11-08.

How to implement

At least annually, and also when relevant threat information arrives or after a relevant incident, test whether your security solutions actually stop or detect the threats you expect, based on current and accumulated threat intelligence. This goes beyond the Level 2 control assessment (is the control in place) to adversary-informed testing (would it work against this actor's techniques). Free adversary emulation tools exist; breach and attack simulation platforms and outside testers are the paid options.

The minimum for a small organization · Expert CMMC's reading, not official text

List your security solutions [a] and the threat intelligence you have gathered [b], and from it the risks you expect [c]. Test whether the solutions hold up against those risks at least once a year, when relevant threat information arrives, and after a relevant incident [d], and feed the gaps into your plan of action.

Required outcome: what the requirement or its objectives call for. Recommended way: one common way to get there. Going further: worth doing, more than this practice asks.

  1. 1
    Required outcomeProcessIdentify the security solutions to be assessed, the current and accumulated threat intelligence you hold, and the risk it anticipates to your systems and the organization.[a][b][c]

    You can tell it worked when the assessment plan names the solutions, the threat intelligence used and the anticipated risks drawn from it.

  2. 2
    Required outcomeProcessAssess the effectiveness of the security solutions at least annually or upon receipt of relevant cyber threat information, or in response to a relevant cyber incident, to address the anticipated risk.[d]

    You can tell it worked when an effectiveness assessment dated within the last 12 months, covering the solutions' deployed settings and not only their design, exists, plus a targeted check for each relevant threat report or incident since.

  3. 3
    Recommended wayPolicyDefine in policy the effectiveness assessment triggers (at least annually, on receipt of relevant cyber threat information, and after a relevant incident), the scope (each security solution in the rationale register, RA.L3-3.11.4e) and who performs and reviews it.[a][d]
  4. 4
    Recommended wayProcessSelect test scenarios from current and accumulated threat intelligence: the ATT&CK techniques of the adversaries in your threat profile, techniques from recent advisories, and those seen in your own incidents.[b][c]
  5. 5
    Recommended wayTechnicalTest the solutions against those scenarios: adversary emulation or breach and attack simulation on test endpoints, phishing and email security tests, detection checks in the SIEM, configuration benchmark comparisons, and results from penetration testing (CA.L3-3.12.1e).[d]
  6. 6
    Recommended wayProcessDocument results per solution: which techniques were prevented, detected or missed, and gaps against anticipated risk; feed gaps into the plan of action, detection engineering and the solution rationale.[c][d]
  7. 7
    Recommended wayProcessWhen a trigger occurs (for example a DCISE or CISA advisory about an actor in your threat profile), run a targeted effectiveness check and record it.[b][d]

Evidence to collect

Artifacts that show the practice is implemented and operating. Tags show which assessment objectives each one supports.

A process you started recently is shown honestly by its dated procedure, the first record it produced and the date it began. No evidence row needs more history than the process has existed, and the review periods shown are suggestions unless a guide page or regulation is named beside them.

Effectiveness assessment policy[d]

Effectiveness assessment report[a][b][d]

Trigger-driven assessment records[d]

Test tool output[d]

Plan of action entries from gaps[c]

Also supports 4 other practices: keep it once

The detail for 5 evidence items: how to produce each, how fresh it must be, what it must include and what it does not show.

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How assessors check

What an assessor examines, asks and tests: 3 notes.

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Tools and products

Named options a contractor can adopt, with an honest cost tier. The industry standard is listed even when it is expensive, alongside what is free and acceptable for a very small shop.

Atomic Red TeamOpen-source adversary emulation testsFree
MITRE CalderaOpen-source adversary emulation platformFree
AttackIQ, SafeBreach or CymulateBreach and attack simulationEnterprise pricing
CISA ScubaGearMicrosoft 365 configuration assessmentFree
Third-party purple team or penetration testProfessional servicePaid

Notes on 5 products for this practice: why each matters here, what it assumes and what stays yours.

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Editorial mentions, not endorsements. Pricing and tiers change; confirm with the vendor and check FedRAMP or GCC High availability where CUI is involved.

Common pitfalls

  • Re-running the Level 2 control checklist and calling it an effectiveness assessment.
  • Tests chosen without reference to threat intelligence.
  • No record of trigger-driven assessments after relevant advisories or incidents.
  • Running emulation in production without change approval and rollback planning.

Platform notes

  • Microsoft 365 (GCC / GCC High)
  • Google Workspace
  • On-premises or MSP-managed

Notes for 3 platforms.

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Related practices: CA.L2-3.12.1, RA.L3-3.11.1e, RA.L3-3.11.4e, CA.L3-3.12.1e, IR.L3-3.6.2e

Editorial implementation guidance published November 14, 2026. It is not part of the official requirement and does not replace the assessment guide.

The NIST requirements this practice is built on, what NIST made of each in the newer edition, and the SP 800-53 controls behind them, each from an official NIST or DoD table. Open any one to read it and see every CMMC practice it supports.

NIST SP 800-172 (Feb 2021)

3.11.5e

SP 800-172 Rev 3

03.11.01E03.11.05E withdrawn; addressed by03.11.03E03.11.05E withdrawn; addressed by800-171 03.11.0103.11.05E withdrawn; addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)800-171 03.11.0403.11.05E withdrawn; addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)800-171 03.12.0103.11.05E withdrawn; addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)800-171 03.12.0303.11.05E withdrawn; addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)

—

SP 800-53 Rev 5

CA-2SCA-7SPM-16SRA-3CSRA-3(1)SRA-3(3)CRA-3(4)SRA-7SSR-6S
How these were reached
  • CA-2 · Control Assessments
    • S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL) · via 800-171 Rev 3 03.12.01 → 800-53 Rev 5 CA-2NIST: 03.12.01 also: 3.11.6e, 3.14.3e addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)
  • CA-7 · Continuous Monitoring
    • S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL) · via 800-171 Rev 3 03.12.03 → 800-53 Rev 5 CA-7NIST: 03.12.03 also: 3.11.6e addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3); SP 800-171 Rev 2 3.4.9 addressed by
  • PM-16 · Threat Awareness Program
    • S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL) · via 800-172 Rev 3 03.11.01E → 800-53 Rev 5 PM-16
  • RA-3 · Risk Assessment
    • S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL) · via 800-171 Rev 3 03.11.01 → 800-53 Rev 5 RA-3NIST: 03.11.01 also: 3.11.4e, 3.11.6e addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)
    • C SP 800-172 (Feb 2021) Appendix C
  • RA-3(1) · Risk Assessment | Supply Chain Risk Assessment
    • S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL) · via 800-171 Rev 3 03.11.01 → 800-53 Rev 5 RA-3(1)NIST: 03.11.01 also: 3.11.4e, 3.11.6e addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)
  • RA-3(3) · Risk Assessment | Dynamic Threat Awareness
    • C SP 800-172 (Feb 2021) Appendix C
  • RA-3(4) · Risk Assessment | Predictive Cyber Analytics
    • S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL) · via 800-172 Rev 3 03.11.03E → 800-53 Rev 5 RA-3(4)
  • RA-7 · Risk Response
    • S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL) · via 800-171 Rev 3 03.11.04 → 800-53 Rev 5 RA-7NIST: 03.11.04 also: 3.11.4e, 3.11.6e addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)
  • SR-6 · Supplier Assessments and Reviews
    • S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL) · via 800-171 Rev 3 03.11.01 → 800-53 Rev 5 SR-6NIST: 03.11.01 also: 3.11.4e, 3.11.6e addressed by (SP 800-171 Rev 3)

Rev 5 paths: D SP 800-171 Rev 2 Appendix D → SP 800-53 Rev 4 control → NIST's Rev 4 → Rev 5 comparison; S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL); C SP 800-172 (Feb 2021) Appendix C. NIST also names this Rev 3 requirement as the successor of other withdrawn requirements: open “How these were reached” under the Rev 5 controls for which, in NIST's words.

Where each link comes from (18 links from 6 official documents)

32 CFR 170.14 Office of the Federal Register / GPO

  • RA.L3-3.11.5e → 3.11.5e“Level 3 security requirement”32 CFR 170.14(c)(4), Table 1, item (xvii)

NIST SP 800-172 → Rev 3 change analysis NIST

  • 3.11.5e → 03.11.05E“Withdrawn”sheet "Change Analysis SP 800-172-R3" row 61

NIST SP 800-172 Rev 3 NIST

NIST SP 800-171 Rev 3 (OSCAL) NIST

  • 03.12.01 → CA-2“Source control”control 03.12.01 link rel=reference (CA-02)
  • 03.12.03 → CA-7“Source control”control 03.12.03 link rel=reference (CA-07)
  • 03.11.01 → RA-3“Source control”control 03.11.01 link rel=reference (RA-03)
  • 03.11.01 → RA-3(1)“Source control”control 03.11.01 link rel=reference (RA-03(01))
  • 03.11.04 → RA-7“Source control”control 03.11.04 link rel=reference (RA-07)
  • 03.11.01 → SR-6“Source control”control 03.11.01 link rel=reference (SR-06)

NIST SP 800-172 Rev 3 (OSCAL) NIST

  • 03.11.01E → PM-16“Source control”control 03.11.01E link rel=external_reference (PM-16)
  • 03.11.03E → RA-3(4)“Source control”control 03.11.03E link rel=external_reference (RA-03(04))

NIST SP 800-172 (Feb 2021) NIST

Trace notes

Notes marked NIST state what the owners' own files say. Notes marked Expert CMMC note are our reading of the links, not official guidance. Neither is a crosswalk link.

About SP 800-172 (Feb 2021) 3.11.5e

  • NIST

    NIST's own files disagree on the relationship of SP 800-172 Rev 3's withdrawn requirements to their successors. NIST SP 800-172 Rev 3, p.23 (03.01.03E) and the other withdrawn entries: "Addressed by 03.01.09E, 03.01.10E, and 03.01.03 (SP 800-171)." The PDF names SP 800-171 Rev 3 requirements too. NIST SP 800-172 Rev 3 (OSCAL), control 03.01.03E link rel=incorporated_into: incorporated_into 03.01.09E and 03.01.10E; the SP 800-171 Rev 3 requirement only as a bare external_reference.

    Sources: NIST SP 800-172 Rev 3, p.23 (03.01.03E) and the other withdrawn entries; NIST SP 800-172 Rev 3 (OSCAL), control 03.01.03E link rel=incorporated_into

  • Expert CMMC note

    The crosswalk uses the publication's "Addressed by" wording and its full list of successors, including the SP 800-171 Rev 3 requirements; NIST's change analysis uses the same wording. (Precedence: the publication of record over OSCAL over supplemental workbooks.)

    Relies on: NIST SP 800-172 Rev 3; NIST SP 800-172 Rev 3 (OSCAL)

Further discussion

This requirement requires the organization to analyze threat intelligence and consider the effectiveness of currently deployed cybersecurity solutions against existing, new, and emerging threats. The goal is to understand the risk to the systems and the organization based on threat intelligence and to make adjustments to security solutions to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. Analysis of solutions should include analysis of operational system settings of the deployed systems and not be solely a conceptual capability analysis. This analysis includes verifying configuration settings are configured as desired by the organization and have not been changed over time. Threat information can be thought of as raw data that may be limited in terms of evaluating the effectiveness of controls across the enterprise. For example, knowledge of a threat that has not been correlated with other threats may result in evaluation of an implementation that only provides partial protection for one set of systems when, in fact, the emerging threat is applicable to the entire enterprise. Large organizations may also have the resources to aggregate, transform, analyze, correlate, interpret, and enrich information to support decision-making about adequacy of existing security mechanisms and methods. Example You are responsible for information security in your organization, which holds and processes CUI. The organization subscribes to multiple threat intelligence sources [b]. In order to assess the effectiveness of current security solutions, the security team analyzes any new incidents reported in the threat feed. They identify weaknesses that were leveraged by malicious actors and subsequently look for similar weaknesses in their own security architecture[a,c]. This analysis is passed to the architecture team for engineering change recommendations, including system patching guidance, new sensors, and associated alerts that should be generated, and to identify ways to mitigate, transfer, or accept the risk necessary to respond to events if they occur within their own organization [d]. Potential Assessment Considerations • Does the organization make adjustments during an incident or operational improvements after an incident has occurred [d]? • Has the organization implemented an analytical process to assess the effectiveness of security solutions against new or compiled threat intelligence [b,c,d]? • Has the organization implemented a process to identify if an operational security solution fails to contribute to the protections needed against specific adversarial actions based on new threat intelligence [a,b,c,d]?

Practice guide notes

Implementation guidance

Editorial examples to help you plan. Adapt them to your environment; the official requirement and objectives remain authoritative.

In plain language

Assess how well security solutions work at least yearly and after relevant threat information or incidents, using current threat intelligence.

Implementation example

Example from the source assessment guide (not a mandatory implementation): You are responsible for information security in your organization, which holds and processes CUI. The organization subscribes to multiple threat intelligence sources [b]. In order to assess the effectiveness of current security solutions, the security team analyzes any new incidents reported in the threat feed. They identify weaknesses that were leveraged by malicious actors and subsequently look for similar weaknesses in their own security architecture[a,c]. This analysis is passed to the architecture team for engineering change recommendations, including system patching guidance, new sensors, and associated alerts that should be generated, and to identify ways to mitigate, transfer, or accept the risk necessary to respond to events if they occur within their own organization [d].

Evidence examples

Examples suggested by the source guide (not an exhaustive or mandatory checklist): Risk assessment policy; security planning policy and procedures; security assessment policy and procedures; security assessment plans; security assessment results; procedures addressing organizational assessments of risk; security plan; risk assessment; risk assessment results; risk assessment reviews; risk assessment updates; threat intelligence information; other relevant documents or records

Common mistakes

Assessing controls only for compliance coverage, never for effectiveness against current threats.

Track this in a workspace

The compliance workspace tracks each objective, its evidence and the tasks to close gaps. It is open to invited contractors while in pilot: request access below.

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Source: DoD CIO · https://dodcio.defense.gov/CMMC/