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CMMC · Rev 2.13L3IA · Identification & Authentication

IA.L3-3.5.1e

Bidirectional Authentication

Requirement

Identify and authenticate systems and system components, where possible, before establishing a network connection using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically based and replay resistant.

Assessment objectives

An assessor checks each lettered objective separately. The letters in brackets elsewhere on this page, such as [a] or [b,c], refer to these.

Determine if:

  1. ODP1Systems and system components to identify and authenticate are defined;
  2. aBidirectional authentication that is cryptographically-based is implemented;
  3. bBidirectional authentication that is replay-resistant is implemented; and
  4. cSystems and system components, where possible, are identified and authenticated before establishing a network connection using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically-based and replay-resistant.

From the CMMC Level 3 Assessment Guide v2.13 · publisher approved 2026-11-08.

How to implement

Level 3 adds device-to-device trust on top of the Level 2 user and device authentication: before a network connection is set up, systems and components must authenticate each other in both directions using cryptography that resists replay. In practice that means certificates on managed endpoints, servers and network infrastructure, and protocols that verify both ends, such as 802.1X with EAP-TLS, IPsec or TLS VPNs with machine certificates, mutual TLS between services, and SSH with verified host keys. Expect to run or buy a PKI and a RADIUS or network access control service, and document the 'where possible' exceptions.

The minimum for a small organization · Expert CMMC's reading, not official text

Decide which systems and components must authenticate each other [ODP1], and use authentication that works in both directions, is based on cryptography and resists replay [a] [b], before a network connection is made wherever possible [c]; keeping the keys in secure storage such as a TPM is the usual way. For a small Level 3 contractor that usually means device certificates with EAP-TLS on wired and wireless networks, certificate-authenticated VPNs where clients validate the gateway, and mutual TLS or Kerberos between servers.

Expert CMMC's adviceseeCMMC Assessment Guide Level 3 v2.13p.38 IA.L3-3.5.1e

Required outcome: what the requirement or its objectives call for. Recommended way: one common way to get there. Going further: worth doing, more than this practice asks.

  1. 1
    Required outcomePolicyDefine the systems and system components to identify and authenticate.[ODP1]
    SourceCMMC Assessment Guide Level 3 v2.13objective [ODP1], p.38
    Quoted words
    • “Systems and system components to identify and authenticate are defined”
  2. 2
    Recommended wayPolicyFor objective [ODP1], list them by connection (client to server, server to server, and devices joining the network), and note where authenticating before connection is not possible. The requirement applies where possible (L3 guide p.38), and the guide's discussion says it applies to client-server authentication, server-server authentication and device authentication, including mobile devices (L3 guide p.39).[ODP1]
    Expert CMMC's adviceseeCMMC Assessment Guide Level 3 v2.13p.38 IA.L3-3.5.1eandCMMC Assessment Guide Level 3 v2.13p.39 IA.L3-3.5.1e
  3. 3
    Required outcomeTechnicalBefore a network connection is set up, have those systems and components, where possible, authenticate each other in both directions with a cryptographic, replay-resistant mechanism (the device proves itself to the network or server, and the network or server proves itself to the device).[a][b][c]

    You can tell it worked when on each connection you listed as in scope, a device that cannot prove its identity (for example one without a valid certificate) is refused, and the device refuses a server or network it cannot authenticate.

    SourceCMMC Assessment Guide Level 3 v2.13objectives [a], [b] and [c], p.38
    Quoted words
    • “Bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically-based is implemented”
    • “Bidirectional authentication that is replay-resistant is implemented”
    • “Systems and system components, where possible, are identified and authenticated before establishing a network connection using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically-based and replay-resistant”
  4. 4
    Recommended wayTechnicalFor objectives [a] to [c], keep the authentication keys in secure storage such as a TPM, keychain or secure element. The guide's discussion says the cryptographic key for authentication transactions is stored in suitably secure storage, for example keychain storage, a TPM, a TEE or a secure element (L3 guide p.39), and its assessment consideration asks whether cryptographic keys are stored securely (L3 guide p.40).[a][b][c]

    You can tell it worked when the private keys sit in protected storage.

    Expert CMMC's adviceseeCMMC Assessment Guide Level 3 v2.13p.39 IA.L3-3.5.1eandCMMC Assessment Guide Level 3 v2.13p.40 IA.L3-3.5.1e
  5. 5
    Recommended wayPolicyIn the SSP, list the connection types in scope (endpoint to wired or wireless network, remote access, site-to-site, server-to-server, service-to-service APIs, administrative sessions), the approved bidirectional mechanisms for each (EAP-TLS, IKEv2 with certificates, mutual TLS, SSH with host and client keys or certificates, Kerberos mutual authentication), and the components where it is not possible (printers, OT, IoT, legacy appliances) with compensating controls such as isolated VLANs and restrictive ACLs.[ODP1]
    Expert CMMC's adviceseeCMMC Assessment Guide Level 3 v2.13p.38 IA.L3-3.5.1e
  6. 6
    Recommended wayTechnicalStand up certificate infrastructure: an internal CA (AD Certificate Services, a cloud PKI or a managed PKI service) issuing device certificates to endpoints, servers and network devices, automatic enrollment and renewal (Intune SCEP/PKCS profiles or GPO autoenrollment), revocation via CRL or OCSP, and FIPS-validated cryptographic modules.[a]
    Expert CMMC's adviceseeCMMC Assessment Guide Level 3 v2.13p.38 IA.L3-3.5.1e
  7. 7
    Recommended wayTechnicalNetwork access: require 802.1X with EAP-TLS on wired ports and WPA2/WPA3-Enterprise Wi-Fi for in-scope devices, and configure clients to validate the RADIUS server's certificate and name. Server-certificate validation is what makes the authentication bidirectional and is the step most often left out.[a][b][c]
    Expert CMMC's adviceseeCMMC Assessment Guide Level 3 v2.13p.38 IA.L3-3.5.1e
  8. 8
    Recommended wayTechnicalRemote and inter-site connections: VPN or zero-trust access that authenticates the device with a machine certificate and validates the gateway certificate; site-to-site IPsec with certificates rather than pre-shared keys where the equipment supports it.[a][b][c]
    Expert CMMC's adviceseeCMMC Assessment Guide Level 3 v2.13p.38 IA.L3-3.5.1e
  9. 9
    Recommended wayTechnicalSystems and services: mutual TLS for APIs and service-to-service traffic, SSH with distributed known_hosts or an SSH certificate authority so clients verify servers, Kerberos with SMB and LDAP signing between Windows systems, and IPsec connection security rules where server isolation is needed.[a][b][c]
    Expert CMMC's adviceseeCMMC Assessment Guide Level 3 v2.13p.38 IA.L3-3.5.1e
  10. 10
    Recommended wayProcessKeep an inventory of in-scope connections and the mechanism each uses, monitor RADIUS and VPN authentication failures and certificate expiry, and review the design and exception list at least annually and when components are added.[ODP1][c]
    Expert CMMC's adviceseeCMMC Assessment Guide Level 3 v2.13p.38 IA.L3-3.5.1e

Evidence to collect

Artifacts that show the practice is implemented and operating. Tags show which assessment objectives each one supports.

A process you started recently is shown honestly by its dated procedure, the first record it produced and the date it began. No evidence row needs more history than the process has existed, and the review periods shown are suggestions unless a guide page or regulation is named beside them.

SSP section on bidirectional authentication[ODP1]

PKI design and certificate profile exports[a]

Also supports 3 other practices: keep it once

See an example

Connection inventory and exception register[ODP1]

The detail for 7 evidence items: how to produce each, how fresh it must be, what it must include and what it does not show.

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How assessors check

What an assessor examines, asks and tests: 3 notes.

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Tools and products

Named options a contractor can adopt, with an honest cost tier. The industry standard is listed even when it is expensive, alongside what is free and acceptable for a very small shop.

AD Certificate Services + Microsoft NPSOn-prem PKI and RADIUSFree
Microsoft Intune certificate profiles / Microsoft Cloud PKICertificate deploymentPaid
SecureW2Cloud RADIUS and managed PKIPaid
Portnox CloudCloud NAC and RADIUSPaid
Cisco ISE / HPE Aruba ClearPassEnterprise NACEnterprise pricing
FreeRADIUS + smallstep step-caOpen-source RADIUS and CAFree

8 dated vendor facts and notes on 6 products for this practice: what each assumes, what it does not cover and what stays yours.

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Editorial mentions, not endorsements. Pricing and tiers change; confirm with the vendor and check FedRAMP or GCC High availability where CUI is involved.

Common pitfalls

Platform notes

  • Microsoft 365 (GCC / GCC High)
  • Google Workspace
  • On-premises or MSP-managed

Notes for 3 platforms.

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Related practices: IA.L2-3.5.2, IA.L2-3.5.4, IA.L3-3.5.3e, SC.L2-3.13.8, SC.L2-3.13.11

Editorial implementation guidance published November 20, 2026. It is not part of the official requirement and does not replace the assessment guide.

The NIST requirements this practice is built on, what NIST made of each in the newer edition, and the SP 800-53 controls behind them, each from an official NIST or DoD table. Open any one to read it and see every CMMC practice it supports.

NIST SP 800-172 (Feb 2021)

3.5.1e

SP 800-172 Rev 3

03.05.01E

—

SP 800-53 Rev 5

IA-2(8)CIA-3CIA-3(1)CS
How these were reached
  • IA-2(8) · Identification and Authentication (organizational Users) | Access to Accounts - Replay Resistant
    • C SP 800-172 (Feb 2021) Appendix C
  • IA-3 · Device Identification and Authentication
    • C SP 800-172 (Feb 2021) Appendix C
  • IA-3(1) · Device Identification and Authentication | Cryptographic Bidirectional Authentication
    • S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL) · via 800-172 Rev 3 03.05.01E → 800-53 Rev 5 IA-3(1)
    • C SP 800-172 (Feb 2021) Appendix C

Rev 5 paths: D SP 800-171 Rev 2 Appendix D → SP 800-53 Rev 4 control → NIST's Rev 4 → Rev 5 comparison; S source control of the SP 800-171 Rev 3 or SP 800-172 Rev 3 requirement (NIST OSCAL); C SP 800-172 (Feb 2021) Appendix C. NIST also names this Rev 3 requirement as the successor of other withdrawn requirements: open “How these were reached” under the Rev 5 controls for which, in NIST's words.

Where each link comes from (6 links from 4 official documents)

32 CFR 170.14 Office of the Federal Register / GPO

  • IA.L3-3.5.1e → 3.5.1e“Level 3 security requirement”32 CFR 170.14(c)(4), Table 1, item (viii)

NIST SP 800-172 → Rev 3 change analysis NIST

  • 3.5.1e → 03.05.01E“Minor Change”sheet "Change Analysis SP 800-172-R3" row 35

NIST SP 800-172 (Feb 2021) NIST

NIST SP 800-172 Rev 3 (OSCAL) NIST

  • 03.05.01E → IA-3(1)“Source control”control 03.05.01E link rel=external_reference (IA-03(01))

Trace notes

Notes marked NIST state what the owners' own files say. Notes marked Expert CMMC note are our reading of the links, not official guidance. Neither is a crosswalk link.

About this practice

Further discussion

The intent of this practice is to prevent unauthorized devices from connecting to one another. One example satisfying this requirement is a web server configured with transport layer security (TLS) using mutual authentication. At a lower level in the OSI stack, IPsec provides application-transparent mutual authentication. Another example would be implementing 802.1X technology to enforce port-based NAC. This is done by enabling 802.1X on switches, wireless access points, and VPN connections for a given network. 802.1X defines authentication controls for devices trying to access a given network. NAC controls authorization and policy management. For this to be implemented, bidirectional authentication must be turned on via 802.1X. Once successfully authenticated, the device may communicate on the network. A final example, at the application-server level, involves the use of Kerberos to control 1) which files a client can access and 2) the transmission of sensitive data from the client to the server. Example 1 You are the network engineer in charge of implementing this requirement. You have been instructed to implement a technology that will provide mutual authentication for client server connections. You implement Kerberos. On the server side, client authentication is implemented by having the client establish a local security context. This is initially accomplished by having the client present credentials which are confirmed by the Active Directory Domain Controller (DC). After that, the client may establish context via a session of a logged-in user. The service does not accept connections from any unauthenticated client. On the client side, server authentication requires registration, using administrator privileges, of unique Service Provider Names (SPNs) for each service instance offered. The names are registered in the Active Directory Domain Controller. When a client requests a connection to a service, it composes an SPN for a service instance, using known data or data provided by the user. For authentication, the client presents its SPN to the Key Distribution Center (KDC), and the KDC searches for computers with the registered SPN before allowing a connection via an encrypted message passed to the client for forwarding to the server. Example 2 You are the network engineer in charge of implementing this requirement. You have been instructed to implement a technology that will provide authentication for each system prior to connecting to the environment. You implement the company-approved scheme that uses cryptographic keys installed on each system for it to authenticate to the environment, as well as user-based cryptographic keys that are used in combination with a user’s password for user-level authentication [a,c]. Your authentication implementation is finalized on each system using an ACM solution. When a system connects to the network, the system uses the system-level certificate to authenticate itself to the switch before the switch will allow it to access the corporate network [a,c]. This is accomplished using 802.1x technology on the switch and by authenticating with a RADIUS server that authenticates itself with the system via cryptographic keys. If either system fails to authenticate to the other, the trust is broken, and the system will not be able to connect to or communicate on the network. You also set up a similar implementation in your wireless access point. Example 3 You are the network engineer in charge of implementing the VPN solution used by the organization. To meet this requirement, you use a VPN gateway server and public key infrastructure (PKI) certificates via a certification authority (CA) and a chain of trust. When a client starts a VPN connection, the server presents its certificate to the client and if the certificate is trusted, the client then presents its certificate to the server [a]. If the server validates the client certificate, an established communications channel is opened for the client to finish the authentication process and gain access to the network via the VPN gateway server [c]. If the client fails final authentication, fails the certification validation, or the VPN gateway fails the certificate check by the client, the communication channel will be denied. Potential Assessment Considerations • Are cryptographic keys stored securely [a]? • Has the requirement been implemented for any of the three use cases, where applicable: client-server authentication, server-server authentication, and device authentication [b,c]?

Practice guide notes

Implementation guidance

Editorial examples to help you plan. Adapt them to your environment; the official requirement and objectives remain authoritative.

In plain language

Have systems and components authenticate each other with cryptographic, replay-resistant methods before a network connection is set up, wherever possible.

Implementation example

Example from the source assessment guide (not a mandatory implementation): You are the network engineer in charge of implementing this requirement. You have been instructed to implement a technology that will provide mutual authentication for client server connections. You implement Kerberos. On the server side, client authentication is implemented by having the client establish a local security context. This is initially accomplished by having the client present credentials which are confirmed by the Active Directory Domain Controller (DC). After that, the client may establish context via a session of a logged-in user. The service does not accept connections from any unauthenticated client. On the client side, server authentication requires registration, using administrator privileges, of unique Service Provider Names (SPNs) for each service instance offered. The names are registered in the Active Directory Domain Controller. When a client requests a connection to a service, it composes an SPN for a service instance, using known data or data provided by the user. For authentication, the client presents its SPN to the Key Distribution Center (KDC), and the KDC searches for computers with the registered SPN before allowing a connection via an encrypted message passed to the client for forwarding to the server. Example 2 You are the network engineer in charge of implementing this requirement. You have been instructed to implement a technology that will provide authentication for each system prior to connecting to the environment. You implement the company-approved scheme that uses cryptographic keys installed on each system for it to authenticate to the environment, as well as user-based cryptographic keys that are used in combination with a user’s password for user-level authentication [a,c]. Your authentication implementation is finalized on each system using an ACM solution. When a system connects to the network, the system uses the system-level certificate to authenticate itself to the switch before the switch will allow it to access the corporate network [a,c]. This is accomplished using 802.1x technology on the switch and by authenticating with a RADIUS server that authenticates itself with the system via cryptographic keys. If either system fails to authenticate to the other, the trust is broken, and the system will not be able to connect to or communicate on the network. You also set up a similar implementation in your wireless access point. Example 3 You are the network engineer in charge of implementing the VPN solution used by the organization. To meet this requirement, you use a VPN gateway server and public key infrastructure (PKI) certificates via a certification authority (CA) and a chain of trust. When a client starts a VPN connection, the server presents its certificate to the client and if the certificate is trusted, the client then presents its certificate to the server [a]. If the server validates the client certificate, an established communications channel is opened for the client to finish the authentication process and gain access to the network via the VPN gateway server [c]. If the client fails final authentication, fails the certification validation, or the VPN gateway fails the certificate check by the client, the communication channel will be denied.

Evidence examples

Examples suggested by the source guide (not an exhaustive or mandatory checklist): Identification and authentication policy; procedures addressing device identification and authentication; network connection policy; security plan; system configuration settings and associated documentation; system design documentation; list of devices requiring unique identification and authentication; device connection reports; system audit records; list of privileged system accounts; other relevant documents or records

Common mistakes

Authenticating users strongly but letting devices and servers connect to each other with no mutual authentication.

Track this in a workspace

The compliance workspace tracks each objective, its evidence and the tasks to close gaps. It is open to invited contractors while in pilot: request access below.

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Source: DoD CIO · https://dodcio.defense.gov/CMMC/